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filed. Article 2087 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
an appeal must be perfected, by obtaining the order and furnish-
ing the security, within ninety days of the date the judgment
becomes final in the trial court by denial of a new trial or by
expiration of the delay to apply for one. Another article of the
Code 79 provides that, when the appeal is taken, the trial court
shall fix the return day "at not more than sixty days from the
date the appeal is granted." (Emphasis added.) In a number
of instances during the year, the appeal bond was not filed until
a few days of the return day; but this filing is too late if more
than ninety days after finality of the trial court judgment, and
the appeal must be dismissed.180 The ninety-day delay within
which the devolutive appeal bond must be filed is determined
in relation to the date of finality of the trial court judgment,
not the return day.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*
CHANGE OF VENUE
Change of venue provisions are based on the idea that a
defendant should not be tried in a parish where there is such
prejudice that a fair trial cannot be had. Prejudice will affect
witnesses, as well as jurors. The Louisiana Constitution recog-
nizes the power of the legislature to provide for change of venue,1
and statutory provisions for change of venue are set out in Title
XX of the 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure. State v. Mejia2
answers a number of important change of venue questions, some
of which are similarly settled in the new code provisions. Of
primary importance was the effect of the then operative limita-
tions that the transfer must be to "an adjoining parish of the
same judicial district, or to a parish of an adjoining district,"'3
and that a second change of venue could not be had "under any
pretence whatsoever. '4 In Mejia the original change of venue
179. LA. Crv. P. art. 2125 (1960).
180. Loftin v. Knost, 197 So.2d 910 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); McCrory v.
Link Belt Co., 195 So.2d 172 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Burke v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 191 So.2d 691 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966). See also Succes-
sion of Jackson, 198 So.2d 749 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Wilkerson v. Luneau,
198 So.2d 183 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
2. 250 La. 518, 197 So.2d 73 (1967).
3. Former La. R.S. 15:293 (1950).
4. Id. 15:294.
421.
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had been to an adjoining parish where the prejudice was so
strong that it precluded a fair trial and a second change was
sought to a more distant parish. In upholding the change of venue
the Louisiana Supreme Court appropriately declared that "to
the extent the legislative enactments (limitations on change of
venue) deprive an accused of due process of law they must
yield."5 The comparable change of venue provision of article
623 of the 1966 Code does not contain either of the statutory
limitations which were found to contravene the due process
requirements of a fair trial in Mejia. It simply states that "when
a change of venue is granted, the court shall transfer the case
to another parish." (Emphasis added.) The former limitation
of a single change of venue has been deleted, for there is no
justification for arbitrarily denying further relief where the
new place of trial proves to be as prejudiced as the original
jurisdiction.6
Mejia announced a sound and very practical principle when
it held that the court to which the case is transferred has "no
discretion in accepting the change, for that court is without
authority to review the action of the removing court."7
A final question, of substantial financial significance, was
presented as to which parish should bear the expense of the
transferred trial. This issue was settled by application of a spe-
cial, and logical, statutory provision which states that the trial
expenses shall "be paid by the respective parish in which the
offense charged may have been committed."8 (Emphasis added.)
INSANITY PROCEEDINGS
State v. Rideau9 serves to clarify important questions con-
cerning insanity proceedings. While these questions were settled
in conformity with former statutory procedures, they will serve
as a valuable guide to application of similar provisions of the
1966 Code of Criminal Procedure.
The Rideau case had been previously tried in Calcasieu
Parish where the court had appointed a sanity commission
5. 250 La. 518, 527, 197 So.2d 73, 76 (1967), quoting from State v. Rideau,
246 La. 451, 455, 165 So.2d 282, 284 (1964).
6. LA. CODE CR. P. art. 623, comment (c) (1966).
7. 197 So.2d 73, 76 (La. 1967), relying on State v. Morgan, 147 La. 205,
84 So.2d 589 (1920). See LA. CODE CR. P. art. 623, comment (b) (1966).
8. Former R.S. 15:529.8, now LA. R.S. 15:304 (Supp. 1966).
9. 249 La. 1111, 193 So.2d 264 (1966).
1968] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1966-1967 423
which had reported that the defendant was sane at the time of
the crime. When the case, after a change of venue, was to be
retried in East Baton Rouge Parish, defense counsel moved for
appointment of a second sanity commission to investigate both
the defendant's present sanity and his sanity at the time of the
crime, and for a hearing to determine defendant's mental con-
dition. The trial judge granted the motion as to present sanity
(capacity to stand trial), but rejected it as to the question of
insanity at the time of the crime (defense on the merits). In
upholding the trial judge's refusal to grant a hearing on the
issue of insanity at the time of the crime, Justice Sanders pointed
out that that defense was "an issue for the jury," and stated
that the trial court's denial of the appointment of a lunacy com-
mission on that issue "will not be disturbed on appeal in the
absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion." "Moreover,"
continued Justice Sanders, "the report of the first commission
was available to the defense."'10 This last factor was of signifi-
cance. The discretion of the trial judge in the appointment of
a sanity commission is continued under article 650 of the 1966
Code of Criminal Procedure, which states that after a plea of
insanity "the court may appoint a sanity commission . . . to
make an examination as to the defendant's mental condition
at the time of the offense." (Emphasis added.)
When a defendant's mental capacity to proceed is questioned,
the court must make a prompt determination of that issue,"
and may order a mental examination of the defendant "when
it has reasonable ground to doubt the defendant's mental capa-
city to proceed."' 2 These procedures had been followed in Rideau.
It should be noted that the prior sanity commission's report
would not be in point on the issue of the defendant's present
capacity to stand trial. Thus a new mental examination was
ordered as to present capacity. Under express procedures of
article 650 of the 1966 Code the court, since the defendant had
pleaded insanity at the time of the crime, could have ordered
the new sanity commission to make a dual examination of the
defendant's "mental condition at the time of the offense" and
his "present mental capacity to proceed." This would facilitate
determination of the insanity defense when that issue was ulti-
mately presented to the jury. The single purpose examination
10. Id. at 1125, 193 So.2d at 269.
11. LA. COD. CR. P. art. 642 (1966).
12. Id. art. 643.
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in Rideau was probably because the trial judge considered the
original examination and report entirely adequate, and possibly
more accurate than a later examination on that issue. This
was, in a last analysis, a matter which addressed itself to the
trial judge's discretion.
A final practical question was posed as to the admissibility
of the commission's report as evidence at the determination of
the sanity defense at the trial. The court recognized the general
rule that the written report of a sanity commission is inadmis-
sible in evidence at the trial, when the commission members
who made the report are present to testify, and for cross-
examination. 13 However, since the defense had cross-examined
the commission members as to the contents of the report, the
state was entitled to offer the report in evidence in connection
with their testimony. "Having opened the door through interro-
gation," stated Justice Sanders, "the defense cannot now be
heard to complain.'1 4 There is every reason to expect that
Article 653 of the new Code, providing for the testimony of
members of the sanity commission upon the trial of the defense
of insanity at the time of the offense, will be similarly inter-
preted by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
INSTITUTION OF PROSECUTIONS FOR INFAMOUS CRIMES
Article 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure conforms
with a controlling state constitutional provision 5 in providing
that prosecutions for non-capital felonies may be "instituted by
indictment or by information." A similar authorization by former
R.S. 15:2 was upheld in State v. Young,1 as against the claim
that it violated the guaranty of the fifth amendment of the Fed-
eral Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on the presentment
or indictment of a grand jury." It was alleged that simple burg-
lary was "an infamous crime" and that the fifth amendment
guaranty was applicable to state prosecutions via the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed that simple burglary,
which is a serious felony necessarily punishable by hard labor,
was "an infamous crime," but rejected the contention that the
13. State v. Snowden, 198 La. 1076, 5 So.2d 355 (1942).
14. 249 La. 1111, 1126, 193 So.2d 264, 269 (1966).
15. LA. CONST. art I, § 9.
16. 249 La. 609, 188 So.2d 421 (1966).
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fifth amendment guaranty of a grand jury indictment for in-
famous crimes was obligatory upon the states as a "due process"
requirement. While some constitutional guaranties have been
held to be obligatory upon the states, as being essential to the
concept of fundamental fairness, not all federal constitutional
guaranties which govern federal courts have been accorded "due
process" status.
It is difficult to see how the general federal requirement of
a grand jury indictment as a means of instituting prosecution
for all infamous crimes, including the charge of simple burglary
in the Young case, is a rule so essential to the fair administra-
tion of justice that the states are not free to adopt their own
procedures for determining how prosecutions for non-capital
felonies may be instituted. The view of the Louisiana Supreme
Court was enunciated in Justice Summers' well-supported opin-
ion, wherein he stated: "Our appreciation of the present state
of the law is that it is not a violation of the Federal Constitu-
tion for the State to provide for prosecution of infamous crimes
by information when the state authorizes that procedure." 17
The Young case is readily distinguishable from such cases
as Malloy v. Hogan,' where the defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination was held to have "become a fundamental part
of the fabric of our society and, hence, is enforceable against
the states"; Gideon v. Wainwright"9 where the sixth amend-
ment's guaranty of right to counsel was held to be so funda-
mental and essential to a fair trial that it applied to state pro-
ceedings; and Pointer v. Texas20 where the sixth amendment's
right of confrontation was similarly found to be so fundamental
and essential to a fair trial that it was made obligatory on the
states by the fourteenth amendment. The particular way in
which a prosecution may be instituted, whether after a grand
jury investigation which is guided by the district attorney as
legal advisor to the grand jury,2' or after an investigation by
the district attorney and his staff, is a matter which can be
entrusted to the states. This is an area where at least two fair
17. Id. at 612, 188 So.2d at 422, citing a number of United States Supreme
Court decisions, including Hiortado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), and
including Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
18. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
19. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
21. LA. CODE CR. P. art. 64 (1966) designates the district attorney as the
grand jury's "legal advisor." This is a usual statement of the district attor-
ney's relationship with the grand jury.
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methods of procedure may be followed, and where a state de-
parture from the federal pattern is not incompatible with fun-
damental "due process."
PROSECUTIONS OF MULTIPLE DRUNKEN DRIVING OFFENDER
Article 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure articulates
an important distinction as to the charging of prior convictions.
Where an offense, such as driving while intoxicated, is graded
according to whether the violator is a first, second, or subse-
quent offender, it is necessary to allege the prior convictions in
the indictment. Such an allegation is essential if the defendant
is to be convicted as a second or subsequent offender. A similar
rule, based upon a less explicit provision of former R.S. 15: 242,
was applied in State v. Montgomery, 2 where the Supreme Court
ordered the conviction and sentence as a second offender set
aside because the prior conviction was inadequately alleged. It
was not sufficient to merely add the phrase "second offense" at
the end of the charge of the crime. The charge of the prior con-
victions must be in full conformity with the requirements of
article 483 that it must "allege the name or nature of the offense
and the fact, date, and court of the conviction." Such allegations
are essential to show that the former conviction was for a viola-
tion of the same statute and to provide essential specific infor-
mation as to the prior conviction.23 In State v. Douglas24 the
Louisiana court held that the reading to the jury, of a multiple
offender information which included the necessary allegations
of the prior convictions, did not deprive the defendant of a fair
trial or due process. The Louisiana Supreme Court's holding
was supported by a recent United States Supreme Court opinion
which adopted a very practical and common sense approach to
the question raised and concluded that "In the face of legitimate
state purpose and the long-standing and widespread use that
attend the procedure under attack here, we find it impossible
to say that because of the possibility of some collateral prejudice
the Texas procedure is rendered unconstitutional under the Due
Process Clause. '25
22. 250 La. 326, 195 So.2d 285 (1967).
23. Thus meeting the enhanced penalty requirements of LA. R.S. 14:98
(1950), Operating a Motor Vehicle while under the Influence of Alcoholic
Beverages.
24. 250 La. 473, 196 So.2d 797 (1967).
25. Id. at 400, 196 So.2d at 799, quoting from the opinion in the consoli-
dated cases of Spencer v. Texas, Bell v. Texas and Reed v. Beto, 87 S.Ct.
648 (1967).
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A different rule is recognized in the second paragraph of
article 483, for the alleging of past felony convictions which may
be the basis of enhanced penalties under the habitual offender
law.26 Here, the prior convictions are not part of the original
charge, and the multiple offender charge is separately brought
after the conviction by a separate information. 2 Thus, there is
no need for including allegations of the prior convictions in the
original charge, and the indictment may not contain an allega-
tion of such convictions.
PRE-TRIAL DIscovERY
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Hunter, re-
affirmed its prior holding that, upon a proper showing that the
state has a written confession of the defendant, the defendant
is entitled to an order requiring the production of that confes-
sion for its inspection. 29 However, the court specifically and
clearly refused to broaden the rule as to written confessions into
full pretrial discovery of the various evidence in possession of
the state.80 Justice Sanders, after a very complete survey of the
Louisiana jurisprudence, concluded that, "it is the settled law
of this State that an accused in a criminal case is without right
to a pre-trial inspection of the evidence upon which the prose-
cution relies for a conviction," a rule which "has been dictated
by vital considerations related to fair balance in criminal pro-
cedure and the protection of the public against the ravages of
crime."3' 1 Justice Sanders pointed out that the court was well
"aware of the serious professional dialogue now in progress on
pre-trial discovery in criminal cases," and made mention of the
fact that the Louisiana State Law Institute, in its 1966 Code of
Criminal Procedure, refrained from adopting pre-trial discovery
for criminal cases8 2
While there is no right of discovery in criminal cases, this
does not mean that defense counsel is to be universally denied
26. LA. R.S. 15:529.1 (1950).
27. Id. 15:529.1D.
28. 250 La. 295, 195 So.2d 273 (1967).
29. State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So.2d 273 (1945); cf. State v. Tune,
13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953), stating the New Jersey and probable majority
rule that "a defendant has no unqualified absolute right to an inspection
of his confession. On the contrary, his application for an inspection is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court."
30. For broad pre-trial discovery procedures see Rule 16, F. R. Crim. P.
31. 250 La. 295, 301, 195 So.2d 273, at 276.
32. See Commissioner v. Caplan, 411 Pa. 563, 192 A.2d 894 (1963), for a
good statement of the practical reasons for denying a right of discovery in
criminal cases.
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access to the state's evidence. Often the district attorney volun-
tarily will make such evidence available. If the district attorney
refuses, and lack of familiarity with the evidence would un-
fairly prejudice the defense, the trial judge would have authority
to order the production of physical evidence and reports for
defense inspection.88 The bill of particulars is another device
which will enable the defense to procure information as to the
basic nature and ingredients of the state's case.84
OBJECTION TO RULING ON CHALLENGE FOR CAUSF-NECESSITY
OF REQUESTING ADDITIONAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
In State v. Cooper8 5 the defendant was convicted of man-
slaughter. On voir dire examination of the petit jurors, the trial
judge refused to permit defense counsel to question a prospec-
tive juror "to ascertain the effect upon the juror .of the failure
of the defendant to take the stand." The defendant exhausted
his peremptory challenges in empaneling the jury, but did not
thereafter attempt to exercise a thirteenth peremptory chal-
lenge. Under those circumstances the court applied the Breed-
love86 doctrine and held that the defendant had not shown that
he was "forced to accept an obnoxious juror" (as required by
applicable former R.S. 15:353), and hence was not in a position
to urge reversible error. The technical Breedlove requirement of
challenging a juror the defendant is forced to keep in order to
be entitled to an appellate review of the trial court's ruling,
placed defense counsel in a very difficult position.
Article 800 of the 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure legis-
latively overrules Breedlove,87 by deleting the former require-
ment of a specific showing that the defendant was "forced to
accept an obnoxious juror." Under this provision defense coun-
sel would have been entitled to an appellate review of the trial
33. LA. CODE CR. P. art. 17 (1966), stating the "Inherent power and
authority of courts," authorizes the court "to issue such writs and orders
as may be necessary or proper in aid of its jurisdiction." While the Hunter
decision makes it clear that there is no right to such a pre-trial inspection,
it does not deny the authority of the trial judge to order production of evi-
dence, reports or documents when basic fairness requires their production,
and especially if the defense offers the state a right to inspect similar ob-
jects or documents in its possession.
34. Justice Sanders points out that the defendant's right to a bill of
particulars "does not mean, however, that the state must furnish to the
defendant the details of the evidence with which it expects to prove its
case." 250 La. 295, 299, 195 So.2d 273, 275 (1967).
35. 249 La. 654, 190 So.2d 86 (1966).
36. State v. Breedlove, 199 La. 965, 7 So.2d 221 (1941).
37. See comments (a) and (b) to art. 800.
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judge's ruling in Cooper. It is now only necessary, in order to
complain of a ruling sustaining a challenge for cause, that de-
fense counsel's "peremptory challenges shall have been ex-
hausted before completion of the panel." A similar liberal ap-
proach should be taken where improper rulings on voir dire
have prevented a fair examination of a prospective juror, and
the defense is forced to eliminate that juror by peremptory
challenge. In such cases there is substantial injury through the
probable future need for the peremptory challenge exercised.
It is not necessary to take the extra step required by Breedlove
and to challenge an additional juror who, after being thus an-
tagonized, will serve on the jury that tries the defendant.
EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh*
JUDICIAL NOTICE
Article 193 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifically pro-
vides that a district court may adopt local rules regulating the
conduct of judicial business before it.' It stipulates that such
rules shall be entered in the court minutes and printed in
pamphlet form, and, further, that on request a copy of the
pamphlet shall be furnished to any attorney licensed to practice
in this state.2 Of course, there is no need to "prove" the existence
of a local rule of court to the trial court; it takes judicial notice
of it.3 Thus, from the standpoint of the lower court there is no
need to have evidence in the record as to the rules of court.
When a case goes up to an appellate court on writs or on
appeal and concerns compliance with a particular local rule of
court, should the appellate court judicially notice the provision
of the local rule? Sciortino v. Sciortino4 presented the question
full force. Defendant had been adjudged guilty of contempt for
wilful refusal to pay a child support award, and sentenced to ten
days in jail by a judge of the Civil District Court for the Parish
of Orleans. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs. Relator
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 193 (1960).
2. For the authority of district courts to adopt local rules of court for
the conduct of criminal cases, see LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 18 (1966). For the
authority of city courts to adopt rules of court, see LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4847
(1960).
3. See Wallace v. Martin, 166 So. 874 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936), and C.
MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 327 (1954).
4. 250 La. 727, 198 So.2d 905 (1967).
